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1493 
STEALTH ACTIVISM: NORM FORMATION BY 
JAPANESE COURTS  
FRANK K. UPHAM
 
As we consider the political and social roles of the Japanese Supreme 
Court and specifically whether it has a conservative influence, we need not 
only to define ―conservative‖ but also to think of what roles a court may 
play in a democratic society. One role that has received a lot of attention in 
this symposium is constitutional judicial review. Both Professors Haley1 
and Law2 agree that the Japanese judiciary has exercised a conservative 
influence in this respect, and Law would probably agree with Haley’s 
summary statement that Japanese courts ―do not seek to be the catalysts of 
social change.‖3  
I disagree with the sweeping nature of such characterizations and 
believe that there are substantial and important exceptions. I have no 
knowledge of the personal motivations of Japanese judges, so I cannot 
assert that they seek to change Japanese society, but I do argue that they 
have done precisely that and, furthermore, that they have done so in a 
manner that goes beyond what American courts have been willing or able 
to do. I disagree with Law’s argument that Japanese judges are trapped in 
a bureaucratic cage, I disagree with the assertion that they are the political 
lackeys of the Liberal Democratic Party as Ramseyer and Rasmusen 
argue,4 and I disagree with Haley’s argument that they are cautious 
reflectors of social consensus. Instead, I contend that Japanese judges have 
played a much more activist role in Japanese society than the American 
federal judiciary has done in American society, despite the fact that the 
American judiciary is frequently touted as a paradigmatic example of 
 
 
  Wilf Family Professor of Property Law, New York University School of Law. Thank you to 
the participants in the Washington University in St. Louis School of Law Conference on Decision 
Making on the Japanese Supreme Court, to attendees at my lecture to the Kobe University Faculty of 
Law, November 10, 2010, and Helen Hershkoff. Prepared for the Symposium on Decision Making on 
the Japanese Supreme Court, Washington University, September 11 and 12, 2010. The author 
acknowledges support from the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at New 
York University of Law. 
 1. John O. Haley, Constitutional Adjudication in Japan: Context, Structures, and Values, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1467 (2011). 
 2. David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1425 
(2011).  
 3. Haley, supra note 1, at 1491. 
 4. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in 
Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331, 331 (2001). 
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judicial activism.5 Perhaps most surprising, given the apparent consensus 
at this conference, they have done so in a ―liberal‖ direction that has 
contradicted the apparent desires of the Liberal Democratic Party and the 
prevailing consensus of Japanese society. No one has noticed, however, 
for two reasons. First, they have not done so in judicial review, where 
American observers of judicial activism are trained to look, but in the 
interpretation of the general clauses of the Civil Code, an area of law that 
is less clearly in the political spotlight. Second, Japanese courts have not 
used their injunctive powers to intervene in the operation of governmental 
bureaucracies and civil society institutions as American courts have in 
instances such as the affirmative action cases discussed briefly below. 
To make this argument, I look at judicial decisions in the areas of 
employment, divorce, and protection against discrimination.6 My 
argument is that Japanese courts are willing to deviate from established 
doctrine, including statutory provisions, to create social norms that they 
consider desirable and that they do so under circumstances where 
American courts would refrain because of considerations of the 
appropriate judicial role. 
 
 
 5. The Japanese courts’ use of general clauses is not so remarkable when the comparison is to 
other civilian jurisdictions. In 1989, for example, the Taiwanese judiciary made a finding that 
requirements in labor contracts that female employees must remain unmarried violated Article 72 of 
the Civil Code of the Republic of China, the equivalent of Article 90 of the Japanese Civil Code. See 
Ku Yen-lin, The Feminist Movement in Taiwan, 1972–87, 21 BULL. CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 12 
(1989). For a more general discussion, see JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 461–79 
(1968). Nor is the role entirely absent from the American scene once one looks beyond the federal 
judiciary and judicial review of governmental action. Professor Helen Hershkoff has demonstrated that 
American state courts will draw on state constitutional norms to create new common law norms in the 
private law areas of tort, contract, and property. See Helen Hershkoff, State Common Law and the 
Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS (James A. Gardener & Jim Rossi eds., 2010). While the actions of 
the Japanese courts described herein do not always explicitly draw on constitutional norms, at times 
they do, and when they do, the similarity to the cases described by Hershkoff is striking. See, e.g., the 
description of the Sumitomo line of gender discrimination cases, infra text accompanying notes 21–22. 
 6. I am not the only one to have remarked on this phenomenon. See DANIEL H. FOOTE, SAIBAN 
TO SHAKAI: SHIHÔ NO ―JÔSHIKI‖ SAIKÔ [THE COURTS AND SOCIETY: RECONSIDERING ―COMMON 
KNOWLEDGE‖ REGARDING JUSTICE] (Masayuki Tamaruya trans., 2006). For an English discussion of 
the courts’ role in the labor area, see Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor 
Law: Activism in the Service of—Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996) [hereinafter Foote, Judicial 
Creation]. Although I argue here that Japanese courts play an active role in the formation of the norms 
governing private relationships, I do not deny that they have been extremely deferential to the 
government when citizens have tried to use litigation to challenge bureaucratic actions or policy. See 
generally FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/5
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I. JUDICIAL SHAPING OF RELATIONSHIPS IN EMPLOYMENT AND 
MARRIAGE  
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the role of the courts in the 
employment relationship is the story of Mr. Shioda and his struggle with 
his employer, Kochi Broadcasting.7 Shioda was assigned to read a 
ten-minute news segment at 6 a.m. On February 23, 1967, he did not 
awake until 6:20, missing the entire broadcast. Two weeks later, on March 
8, he again overslept but managed to get to the microphone by 6:05 to read 
half of the broadcast. Remarkably, since his failure had literally been 
broadcast to the world, Shioda did not report the second incident. Not 
surprisingly, the company discovered the facts and fired him. Shioda sued 
for wrongful discharge.  
To win, he had to overcome statutory language in both the Civil Code 
and the Labor Standards Law that gives both parties in an employment 
relationship the freedom to terminate without any reason.8 To make the 
task even more difficult, he was hardly blameless. Within two weeks, 
Shioda had twice failed to perform a simple and fundamental duty for the 
company, one that had an immediate effect on the company’s reputation, 
without the slightest excuse or extenuating circumstance. Then he had lied 
about it. 
Nonetheless, the district court, high coFurt, and Supreme Court all 
agreed with Shioda and ordered his reinstatement. The Supreme Court did 
not shy away from the facts. It recognized that the company had not 
disciplinarily discharged Shioda; that he had violated work rules without a 
satisfactory reason; that the company had suffered therefrom; and that 
Shioda had not dealt with the incident honestly. ―However,‖ the Court 
continued, 
his [Shioda’s] failures were not caused by malice or intent but rather 
by negligence, namely oversleeping. It is rather too harsh to blame 
only the plaintiff since in both instances the reporters who were 
supposed to wake him also overslept and failed to give him the 
script of the broadcast. The plaintiff apologized immediately after 
his first failure, and in the second instance he tried to start work as 
 
 
 7. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 1977, 268 RŌDŌ HANREI 17. 
 8. Article 627 of the Civil Code reads as follows: ―If no period for the service has been fixed by 
the parties, either party may at any time give notice to the other party to terminate the contract; in such 
case the contract of service shall come to an end upon the expiration of two weeks after such notice.‖ 
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 627 (Supreme Court translation 1959) The Labor Standards Act extends 
the notice period to 30 days. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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soon as he woke up. In neither case was the missed period of 
broadcasting too long. . . . His submission of a coverup report was 
partly the result of . . . his awkwardness over his repeated mistakes 
in a short period. Considering all these points, he is not to be 
blamed too much.9 
The Court went on to note that Shioda’s job performance up to this point 
had not been ―particularly bad‖ and that he had eventually apologized for 
the second incident.
10
 These circumstances made the company’s reaction 
appear unreasonably severe in the eyes of the Court, and it declared the 
dismissal null and void as inconsistent with the ―common sense of 
society‖ as stipulated in the general clauses of the Civil Code.11  
It is important here to restate what is remarkable about the Supreme 
Court’s decision and opinion. It is not its solicitude for the employee. 
Many developed countries have made it very difficult to fire employees, 
but they have done so via legislation, not via the judiciary’s total rewriting 
of the statutes governing the employment relationship.12 Nor have 
Japanese courts limited their activism in the employment sphere to 
discharges. They have systematically narrowed companies’ discretion 
across a wide range of areas including discipline, transfers, and the 
termination of temporary employment.13 In doing so, they have relied on 
the general clauses of the Civil Code, extremely vague provisions that 
allow interventionist courts to use phrases like ―good public order,‖ ―good 
faith,‖ or ―the common sense of society‖ to effectively nullify legislation. 
This pattern has been repeated in the area of private gender discrimination 
in employment, but before we reach these cases, it is worth briefly 
recounting the courts’ role in contested divorce, where it did not have to 
resort to the general clauses but innovatively interpreted the language of a 
 
 
 9. Frank K. Upham, Visions of Justice in Postwar Japan: A Preliminary Inquiry, in LAW IN 
EAST AND WEST / RECHT IN OST UND WEST 145, 150 (Inst. of Comparative Law, Waseda Univ. ed., 
1988). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. But see Helen Hershkoff, ―Just Words‖: Common Law and the Enforcement of State 
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1559–63 (2010) (discussing the 
judicial development of a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge by state courts drawing on 
constitutional norms). These cases, although similar in many respects to the Shioda line of cases, were 
in one important sense less intrusive into the democratic process. They were revising an at-will 
employment doctrine that the courts had themselves created as part of state common law. In Japan, the 
judiciary revised statutory language created by the national legislature, rather than their own previous 
decisions. 
 13. See Foote, Judicial Creation, supra note 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/5
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specific statute to make marriages almost as difficult to sever unilaterally 
as the employment relationship.14 
If they agree, Japanese spouses need only register with local 
government to get a divorce. If it is contested, however, judicial action is 
required, and Civil Code Article Section 770(1), as amended in 1947, lists 
the permissible grounds. The first four restate prewar fault-based grounds 
such as adultery, but the fifth, ―any other grave reason for which it is 
difficult for the [plaintiff/spouse] to continue the marriage,‖ transformed 
the prewar fault regime with what has been called an ―incompatibility‖ 
regime.15 The 1947 amendment was part of the Occupation reform of the 
family law and was intended to eliminate the patriarchal household system 
that reformers saw as a pillar of militarism and the oppression of women.  
In 1952, however, the Supreme Court essentially reinstated the fault 
regime by interpreting the fifth ground to reject any divorce petition by a 
spouse who was morally culpable. Although the Court portrayed its reason 
as the protection of morality, stating that ―the primary role of the courts is 
the protection of good morals,‖ they were not looking to revive the prewar 
system. On the contrary, since at that time it was usually the husband 
seeking a divorce, the practical effect of this interpretation was to deny a 
divorce to a husband who had committed any transgression against the 
marriage—adultery was the likely one—no matter how total the 
breakdown of the marriage, a move interpreted as an attempt to protect the 
married status of women or at least give them a chip in the bargaining over 
property division. Whatever the Court’s motivation, however, its action is 
difficult to understand as anything other than the favoring of the Court’s 
interpretation of the social conditions of the age over that of conservative 
male legislators.  
Just in case anyone might have thought that the 1952 Court’s action 
was aberrational—perhaps explainable as a one-time rejection of 
Occupation norms imposed on the citadel of traditional Japanese values—
the Court in 1987 again unilaterally changed the rules for contested 
divorce in a decision that at least has the virtue of candor in that this time 
the Court explicitly overruled its prior decisions.16 By this time, the 
financial position of Japanese women had improved dramatically, and the 
 
 
 14. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 19, 1952, 6 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
110. The case is available in English in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND 
MATERIALS 74 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976). 
 15. THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 78.  
 16. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 2, 1987, 41 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 
1423. This case is available in English in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 531 (Milhaupt, Ramseyer & 
West eds., 2006). 
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Court significantly liberalized the fifth ground of Article 770(1) by 
allowing an adulterous husband to pursue a divorce. In reversing course, 
without any change in the statutory language, the Court established a set of 
factors that should be considered when judges contemplate granting 
divorces to ―responsible spouses,‖ and the judiciary has been tinkering 
with the meaning and weight of these factors ever since.17 In the 
meantime, the Diet has not been totally inactive, considering legislation on 
this precise point at least since 1995. The fact that the Diet has actively 
discussed amendments to Article 770-1-5 but has not acted underscores 
the Court’s lack of deference to the legislative branch. 
II. TACKLING INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
Whatever causal power one attributes to the courts’ remaking of labor 
and divorce law, it is undeniable that both Japanese labor and marriage 
practices subsequently conformed to the norms espoused by the courts in 
these areas. In contrast to prewar patterns, postwar Japan enjoyed 
extremely low divorce rates and became famous for the practice of 
long-term ―permanent employment‖ and a legal regime that made it 
extremely difficult to discharge employees. The courts’ equally aggressive 
interpretations of the doctrines concerning private discrimination, on the 
other hand, have been met with less wholehearted acceptance by the 
government and people of Japan. We look here at the issue of gender 
discrimination in employment. 
Japanese women share the judiciary’s reputation for passivity in this 
period. While certainly given credit for contributing to social stability, 
their role is generally portrayed as being good wives and mothers. They 
are seldom seen as demanding their legal rights, but instead as remaining 
quietly in their place, but there is at least one important exception to this 
picture. Starting in the late 1950s, Japanese women began to sue their 
employers for sex discrimination and have continued to do so up to the 
present.18 At the beginning, the courts not only supported them, but also 
did so in the face of contrary statutory language and virtually universal 
social practice.  
 
 
 17. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 18, 2004, 1881 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 90. This case 
is available in English in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 533 (Milhaupt, Ramseyer & West eds., 
2006). 
 18. For the history, see UPHAM, supra note 6. For an example of more recent litigation, see 
Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Nov. 5, 2003, 1846 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 116, rev’d, Tōkyō 
Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Jan. 31, 2008, 2005 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 92. Both parties appealed 
to the Supreme Court, but both appeals were rejected by the Third Petty Bench Judgment of October 
20, 2009. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/5
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When these cases began, the statutory basis for protection against sex 
discrimination in employment was thin; perusal of the statutes might have 
led one to the conclusion that sex discrimination was not only tolerated, 
but fully anticipated. It is true that Article 14 of the Constitution flatly 
prohibits sex discrimination, but the Constitution applies directly only to 
state action. Other constitutional provisions reinforce the equality principle 
in the area of family law, but until the promulgation of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act in 1985, the only statutory provision 
covering sex discrimination was Article 4 of the Labor Standards Act 
(LSA), which prohibited wage discrimination on the basis of sex. Sex is 
conspicuously absent from LSA Article 3, which outlaws discrimination 
on the basis of citizenship, religion, and social origin. Other sections of the 
LSA expressly required gender discrimination by granting female workers 
protection from certain types of work. Furthermore, employment practices 
at the time routinely discriminated against women in almost all terms of 
employment. 
This left the prospective plaintiff with the provisions of the Civil Code. 
Article 1-2 provides that the Code is to be interpreted ―from the standpoint 
of the dignity of the individual and the essential equality of the sexes,‖ 
language added as part of Occupation reforms aimed at improving the 
legal status of women.
19
 Article 1-2 is supplemented by Article 90, which 
provides that any ―juristic act whose object is such as to be contrary to 
public order or good morals is null and void.‖20 Neither Article, however, 
was meant to apply directly to routine cases or as an obvious basis for 
courts or litigants to employ against discriminatory practices that were not 
only ubiquitous but also socially legitimate. Nonetheless, it is this basis 
that courts used to prohibit a range of personnel practices beginning with 
forced retirement upon marriage and continuing on to sex harassment on 
the job. 
As with the transformation of the LSA’s at-will employment regime, 
perhaps the best way to illustrate the courts’ approach is with an example, 
such as the Sumitomo Cement case decided by the Tokyo District Court on 
December 20, 1966. Suzuki Setsuko went to work for Sumitomo Cement 
in 1960, when Sumitomo’s employment regulations required women to 
retire upon marriage. Three years later, she married, refused to resign, and 
was fired. The Tokyo District Court, in an approach confirmed later by the 
Supreme Court, noted the economic hardship imposed on women forced to 
 
 
 19. MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 1-2. 
 20. Id. art. 90. 
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retire upon marriage and concluded that such hardship was a substantial 
restriction of the freedom to marry guaranteed in Article 24 of the 
Constitution. Since the Constitution was not directly applicable to private 
behavior, the court turned to Article 90 and the definition of ―public order 
and good morals‖ in the context of private employment discrimination. 
Sumitomo pointed out that similar practices were virtually universal in 
Japanese employment; that they were expected and accepted as natural and 
fair by workers, unions, and employers; and that they were consistent with 
Japanese values and traditions. The court rejected this invitation to ratify 
social practice and instead referred to the ideals that they found embodied 
in the Constitution: ―The essential equality of the sexes must be realized. 
The prohibition of unreasonable discrimination not just in relationships 
between the state and private individuals, but also in relationships wholly 
within the private sector, is a fundamental principle of the law.‖21 The 
court brushed aside the provisions of the LSA and ridiculed Sumitomo’s 
argument that women were inherently inefficient, declaring that unlike the 
shrine maidens of Shinto ritual, where religious doctrines require virginity, 
there was no reason for requiring Sumitomo’s female employees to be 
single. 
This general doctrinal approach was extended in case after case over 
the next two decades to mandatory retirement of women at pregnancy or 
childbirth, at a young age (often thirty), at a mature age younger than men 
(often fifty versus fifty-five), and to the singling out of women for layoff 
during hard economic times. Although the plaintiffs and others resisted 
these practices, they were, as Sumitomo had argued, the norm and not the 
exception, and yet Japanese courts struck them down without any specific 
statutory basis and, ironically, justified their actions on general clauses 
that are themselves premised on social norms. Unless we give to the 
judiciary the right to define public morality on its own, one would think 
that doctrine, predominant social practice, and legislative acceptance of 
the status quo would be the dominant sources to which courts would turn 
for the social norms referenced in Articles 90 and 1-2. Instead, the court 
relied almost entirely on the Constitution, which, of course, the court itself 
had already declared did not apply to private behavior.  
 
 
 21. UPHAM, supra note 6, at 132–33. Although in a somewhat different context, the Illinois 
Supreme Court used strikingly similar language in 1981 to find a public policy exception to the at-will 
doctrine: ―In general, it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects 
the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State’s constitution and statutes and, when 
they are silent, in its judicial decisions.‖ Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 
1981). 
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What is remarkable about this process from the point of view of 
comparative law, however, is not solely the assertiveness of the Japanese 
judiciary; it is also the almost universal invisibility of this assertiveness to 
the rest of Japanese society and to academic observers. When Japan 
eventually passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) in 
1985, its provisions essentially codified the doctrines that the Court had 
developed judicially over the previous twenty years. Despite what to an 
outside observer would appear to be a clear causal connection between a 
series of cases outlawing certain practices and a statute that outlawed 
exactly the same practices and effectively no others, I know of no 
Japanese commentator on the EEOL who mentioned the courts when 
discussing the origins of the Act. Instead, they focused on gaiatsu 
(external pressure), an American-led foreign assault on Japanese traditions 
and values. Even as late as 2000, when the Japanese concern over gaiatsu 
had abated, a leading Japanese labor law scholar ignored the Sumitomo 
line of cases entirely and explained the passage of the EEOL as follows: 
―In 1980, the Japanese government signed the Convention Concerning the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted by 
the UN in 1979. In order to ratify the Convention, the government needed 
to make necessary adjustments in national legislation.‖22  
Most of the commentators (and all of the legal ones) knew of the 
Sumitomo line of cases, but they apparently gave them no causal power. 
The 1980s was a time when the Japanese found themselves under constant 
foreign pressure to reform their economic practices, and a sense of being 
bullied by the West may explain why they found it more congenial to 
blame the Americans than their own courts for what many may have seen 
as an attack on ―traditional‖ practices. Cultural nationalism does not 
explain, however, the continuation of this view into the twenty-first 
century as exemplified by the quotation of the labor law scholar above. 
Nor does it help with the bewilderment of Americans who find it hard to 
understand how the Reagan administration, not known for its advocacy of 
women’s rights at home, became such a strident advocate of them abroad. 
But the important point here is that if the courts were not seen as a 
significant cause of the change in social and employment practices, the 
question of whether the judiciary was exceeding its appropriate role in a 
democracy was literally inconceivable.23 
 
 
 22. Takashi Araki, Equal Employment and Harmonization of Work and Family Life: Japan’s 
Soft-Law Approach, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 451, 452 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 23. The discrimination story does not end with female employees. Although there is even less 
visibility and impact, the courts have often been ahead of social practice in status and racial 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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It is important not to understate the boldness of the Japanese courts 
here, at least from an American perspective. First, the general clauses were 
meant to provide a means to reach justice in cases when the strict 
application of the legal rules will lead to a result inconsistent with the 
purpose of the norm, not to give the courts the power to supplant, even 
temporarily, the legislature as the institution responsible for establishing 
fundamental norms. Second, these decisions went directly against the 
interests of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Frustrating aging 
businessmen wishing to marry their mistresses, forcing companies to 
retain lazy workers, and preventing employers from utilizing female 
employees as they wished were not normally considered part of the LDP 
platform. Nor is it likely, given that the LDP was repeatedly reelected 
during this period, that the courts’ values were strongly held by the 
majority of Japanese.24 It is, of course, possible to argue that the 
judiciary’s actions were one part of a larger evolution of social attitudes, 
but that does not explain or justify why it was the courts that determined 
the specific direction and pace of change. Wherever one might put the 
causal weight, the boldness and the ―liberal‖ direction of the courts’ 
interventions are clear, even when we compare them to what most 
observers would say is the most interventionist judiciary in the world, that 
of the United States.  
III. JAPANESE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM FROM AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 
Whatever one thinks of the activism of Japanese judges, their role 
generally ends with the statement of norms via doctrinal interpretation. 
Thereafter, the initiative returns to the legislature and cabinet and 
ultimately to the society at large. They may chose to validate the judicially 
created rule, or they may find ways to circumvent or contain it, or they 
may simply ignore it, but whatever other political actors do, the courts 
tend to leave them alone to make of the judicially created norms what they 
will.25 American courts behave very differently. Although reluctant to defy 
 
 
discrimination as well, drawing on a variety of doctrinal sources to do so. See UPHAM, supra note 6, at 
97–103 (discussion of the courts’ treatment of the Burakumin). 
 24. It is true that the Diet never repudiated the courts’ actions, but to interpret legislative silence 
as evidence that the courts had been simply reiterating preexisting dominant social attitudes seems 
improbable.  
 25. This approach was captured well by a concurring opinion by Justice Saito Kitaro in the 
Koshiyama electoral malapportionment case where he discussed Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting 
opinion in Baker v. Carr and concluded that the Japanese Supreme Court would better play its 
constitutional role by putting the court’s ―trust in the power of public opinion and in the conscience of 
the legislative and administrative organs.‖ KENNETH L. PORT & GERALD PAUL MCALINN, 
COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 191 (2d ed. 2003). 
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statutory language, once they are involved, they do not relinquish control. 
On the contrary, in most cases, they doggedly pursue compliance and are 
willing to use their injunctive power to compel it when necessary, 
including against the democratically elected branches of government.26 It 
is this direct intrusion into day-to-day governance, rather than any 
boldness in making law, that is likely the main cause of American courts’ 
reputation for judicial activism. A brief review of the two courts’ roles in 
sex discrimination will illustrate. 
The constitutions of both countries contain provisions prohibiting 
invidious discrimination based on certain categories, with the Japanese 
Constitution including sex as well as the American categories of race, 
religion, and national origin. Both Supreme Courts have interpreted these 
prohibitions to apply only to discrimination based on state action.27 
Consistent with doctrine, American courts refused to find sex 
discrimination actionable in any context, even when committed by the 
government itself,28 until its inclusion in the civil rights acts of the 1960s, 
despite a social history of fairly strong feminist politics. This reticence is 
in contrast to Japanese courts, which, as we have seen, acted without any 
specific statutory basis and in a society with a much weaker feminist 
movement. 
Although American courts may not be so bold as Japanese ones in 
terms of creating social norms, once they are given a norm through the 
political process, American courts are resolute in enforcing them. 
Affirmative action is an example. Most Americans equate affirmative 
action with judicial decrees that businesses, universities, governments, 
etc., must take ―affirmative action‖ to hire or admit a certain number of 
women, minorities, or other previously disadvantaged groups. This 
popular perception is true only in the narrowest sense: It is indeed judicial 
orders that mandate specific quotas, require specific remedial action, or 
establish elaborate monitoring and reporting procedures, but the phrase 
―affirmative action‖ did not emerge from a judicial opinion written by a 
liberal court determined to remake the world as most of us blithely 
assume. Affirmative action was brought into the American lexicon by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 706(g).29 It was, in other words, the 
 
 
 26. See Haley, supra note 1 (discussing judicial powers). 
 27. UPHAM, supra note 6, at 130.  
 28. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62–63 (1961) (limitations on female jury duty), 
overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
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product of the democratic process, and all that the courts have been doing 
since 1964 is enforcing the legislative mandate.  
To leave the comparison here, however, would be disingenuous, 
implying that the views that Americans and Japanese have of their courts’ 
roles are wildly out of touch with reality. In fact, popular perceptions are 
solidly based on real differences, including the respective injunctive reach 
discussed above, that make American courts seem all powerful and that 
conversely render their Japanese counterparts virtually invisible. My point 
is not so much that the stereotypes are wrong, but that the attention to the 
dramatic clashes between American branches of government inherent in 
constitutional judicial review obscures what is occurring at deeper 
structural levels in both societies. American courts are reluctant to change 
norms openly, especially if those norms have been legislatively created. 
There are exceptions, of course, even on the federal level, and Roe v. 
Wade30 may be the most famous, but most of the instances that we think of 
as judicial activism, such as Brown v. Board of Education31 declaring 
school segregation unconstitutional, have been firmly based on statutory 
or constitutional text. Even when that text is open textured, it is rarely as 
capacious as the ―good public order,‖ ―good faith,‖ and ―the common 
sense of society‖ language that the Japanese courts rely on with such ease.  
One of the most remarkable aspects of the place of courts in Japanese 
society and politics is their almost total invisibility until the late
 
twentieth 
century when they were criticized, paradoxically, not for being too 
assertive but for being out of touch with Japanese society.32 Despite full 
media coverage of judicial decisions, judicial activism is rarely mentioned 
in political debate, academic commentary, or among the very lawyers who 
induce the courts to rewrite legislation. The only exception is the reaction 
of progressive lawyers, who often bemoan the conservatism of the courts 
when they lose. Otherwise, it appears as if most Japanese think of the 
judiciary as ―the law,‖ not as an institution with its own identity and 
agenda, even when the Supreme Court aggressively interprets the divorce, 
discrimination, or employment laws to protect vulnerable segments of 
society and then, years later, reinterprets them.  
There are undoubtedly many reasons the social role of Japanese courts 
remains politically invisible: the apolitical judicial selection process, the 
absence of federalism, the bureaucratic nature of the judiciary, the 
historical lack of attention to the separation of powers, and the nature of 
 
 
 30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 32. See LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT, at xxii (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (discussion of the 
Justice System Reform Council and subsequent reforms to the Japanese legal system). 
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Japanese politics itself. To this list I would add their willingness to allow 
the political process to operate after judicial announcement of the law, 
especially when contrasted with the opposite tendency of American courts. 
But these institutional explanations may miss the true source of our vastly 
different perceptions of these two judiciaries: a deep and abiding inability 
to overcome our stereotypes about the two legal systems, which may be 
best illustrated by an incident that occurred at the conference on which this 
volume is based. 
When two American law professors learned that I was about to assert 
that ―affirmative action‖ was a creature of statute, not of judicial 
overreaching, they vigorously assured me that I was mistaken. That two 
law professors could be so confidently mistaken about the origin of such a 
controversial and central topic in American legal politics as affirmative 
action is itself remarkable, but what really demonstrates the tenacity of our 
stereotypes is my reaction. Despite having consulted the United States 
Code Annotated less than a month before to confirm the presence there of 
―affirmative action,‖ I immediately deleted the assertion from my 
presentation. Part of my reaction was respect for my colleagues, but the 
real reason was that my own deeply held stereotype of aggressive 
American courts simply overwhelmed the facts—facts that I had 
confirmed myself just weeks before. 
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